As we have seen, abortion is a complex moral issue with
psychological, social, medical, and political dimensions. In the heat of
debate the basic ethical considerations are sometimes lost. Communication
between the opposing groups rarely gets beyond the shouting stage. It is
therefore necessary to clarify the basic ethical issues at stake, which we
will do by surveying three major positions held in America today: abortion
"on demand"; abortion "on indication"; and abortion "only to save the life
of the mother." This chapter will outline the main lines of argument that
characterize these representative positions. In chapter four, after examining
the biblical evidence in detail, we will critically evaluate the various
positions.
Abortion "On Demand"
A notable representative of the abortion "on demand" position
is Joseph Fletcher, widely known author of Situation Ethics: The
New
End of Page 9 - Begin Page 10
Morality, and professor of medical ethics at the University of Virginia School of Medicine. Professor Fletcher's books and articles in professional journals are widely read in the American medical community and have had considerable influence there. In a recent book, The Ethics of Genetic Control, Fletcher discusses abortion in connection with recent issues arising in genetics and medicine, such as artificial insemination, sperm banking, and cloning.[1] He observes that changing attitudes toward human sexuality and the development of modern contraceptive devices have largely separated sexual activity from procreation:
Technology, whether of the "hard" physical kind or the "soft" biological kind, is man's creation and man's hallmark.....Love making and baby making have been divorced. Sex is free from the contingencies and complications of reproduction, and sexual practice can now proceed on its own merits as an independent value in life...."Make love, not people." This is the rock-bottom fact of the new age and the new morality." [2]
Seen in that light, abortion represents one of the many technological
means for controlling natural processes such as human procreation, in deference
to personal values such as individual freedom and self-fulfillment. Modern
man has learned increasingly to subdue the natural order through science
and technology, and now modern contraceptive devices and abortion techniques
extend such technological control to the biological dimensions of human life
and procreation.
Fletcher's position on abortion embodies a pragmatic approach
to moral reasoning. Decisions are made not on the basis of a priori
moral principles, but on the basis of a rational calculation of the probable
consequences of a given line of action:
....there are in the end only two ways of deciding what is right. Either we will obey a rule (or a ruler) of conscience, which is the a priori or prejudiced approach, or we will look as reasonably as we can at the facts and calculate the consequences, the human costs and benefits — the pragmatic way.....Most of us decide for or against things on the principle of proportionate good. We try to figure out the gains and losses that would follow from one course of action or another and then choose the onePage 11
that is best, the one that offers the most good. This calculation of consequences is often called a trade-off or cost benefit analysis. [3]
In Fletcher's view, a priori rules must not take precedence over
specific calculations of probable costs and benefits to people in the concrete
ethical situation. Moral principles may provide useful guidelines for ethical
reflection, but they should not be understood as absolutely binding in every
circumstance. Under certain circumstances it may be legitimate and morally
right to violate widely held moral rules, e.g., rules prohibiting adultery
and the taking of innocent human life, if a greater personal good would result.
[4]
Fletcher's cost-benefit approach does recognize that the critical
issue is the status of the human being developing in the womb. "The most
basic issue is whether a fetus is a person or not."[5] If
costs and benefits are to be calculated with the interests of all
the persons involved, then the personhood of the unborn must be resolved
in some fashion. Fletcher observes that there are three predominant views
concerning human personhood: the identification of personhood with biological
life, beginning at fertilization; the identification of personhood with the
soul, either at the time of conception or at some discrete point thereafter;
and the identification of personhood with the rational functions of human
personality.
Fletcher opts for the third alternative: "Humans without some
minimum of intelligence or mental capacity are not persons, no matter how
many of their organs are active, no matter how spontaneous their living processes
are."[6] In Fletcher's view, a score of, say, 20 on the
Binet scale of I.Q. would be a minimum criterion of personhood. "Obviously,"
he notes, "a fetus cannot meet this test, no matter what its stage of
growth."[7] The most sensible position, he believes, is
to hold that the unborn become persons at birth, when the umbilical cord
is cut and the lungs begin to function.[8] Since on this
basis the woman is understood to have full personal status and the developing
child none, abortion at any stage of pregnancy becomes justifiable whenever
the cost-benefit calculation indicates that it would be in the woman's own
interests.
Fletcher recognizes the difficulty of evaluating the competing
claims about the personhood of the unborn in a pluralistic society.
Page 12
He maintains that the only possible way of evaluating such claims is a pragmatic one:
The only possible moral test of these rival views lies in their consequences. When beliefs or nonempirical opinions, neither of them being falsifiable, contradict or clash with each other, the only possible way to choose between them morally is in terms of their consequences if they are followed out logically in practice. The one which results in greater good for people is the correct one. On this basis there is an open and shut case for abortion. Obvious and overwhelming, it can be justified very often, sometimes for reasons of human health, sometimes for reasons of human happiness. [9]
To Fletcher's way of thinking, the view that personhood is present from
conception not only is empirically unverifiable, but also would cause more
harm than good for society. Consequently, it should not be the basis for
social policy. The only reasonable policy, he asserts, is to put an end to
compulsory pregnancy. "The ethical principle is that pregnancy when wanted
is a healthy process, pregnancy when not wanted is a disease — in fact,
a venereal disease. The truly ethical question is not whether we can justify
abortion but whether we can justify compulsory
pregnancy."[10] Thus, having decided to view the unborn
as nonpersons, Fletcher concludes that the freedom to abort is desirable
both as a personal ethic and as a public policy.
Abortion "On Indications"
While few evangelicals support abortion "on demand," many argue
that certain medical or social circumstances provide justifiable grounds
for abortion. An important representative of this perspective in evangelical
circles is Professor Norman Geisler of Dallas Theological Seminary, who
articulates his position in the widely used textbook, Ethics: Alternatives
and Issues. [11]
Geisler begins by making a careful distinction between contraception
and abortion: contraception is an attempt to prevent life from beginning;
abortion, a much more serious matter, is an attempt to take life after it
has already begun.[12] But is abortion the moral equivalent
of murder? Geisler thinks not and points to Exodus 21:22
Page 13
as scriptural support for this view: "When men strive together, and
hurt a woman with child, so that there is a miscarriage, and yet no harm
follows, the one who hurt her shall be fined....."[13]
According to this reading of the text, the capital penalty was to be inflicted
for the death of the mother, but not for the death of the child in the womb.
On this view, the Mosaic law did not consider an unborn child to be a person
in the full sense of the word. Such a view permits one to weigh the value
of the actual life of the mother against the value of the
potential life of the unborn child when there appears to be an inescapable
conflict between the two.
Geisler's position grew out of an ethical framework he calls
hierarchicalism. It holds that there are many universally valid moral
norms, and these can be arranged in a hierarchical fashion. In the case of
a tragic conflict between two moral norms, the higher norm (e.g., preserving
innocent human life) takes precedence over the lower norm (e.g., telling
the truth). Thus, when Rahab the harlot lied to protect the Israelite spies
[Joshua 2], she chose not the lesser of two evils, but a positively
right course of action. The hierarchical approach makes it possible
for the Christian to choose a positive good in any situation, no matter how
tragic the circumstances.
As it applies to abortion, the hierarchical understanding affirms
as a matter of principle that "an actual person is of more value that a potential
person":
....just as the actual plant is more valuable than the seed (potential plant), so a mother is more intrinsically valuable as a person than the fertilized ovum within her womb. For the mother is an actual person, whereas the embryo is only a potential person. She is a mature, free, autonomous subject; the unborn has only the potential to become such. Hence, it would follow that when there are irresolvable conflicts between the values involving potential humans and actual humans, the actual should take precedence over the potential. [14]
This distinction between "actual" and "potential" personhood is based on a view of personhood in which qualities such as self-awareness, self-determination, and the capacity for interpersonal relationships are the determining factors. Since the unborn only exhibit these qualities to a very limited degree, they must be
Page 14
considered potential rather than actual persons.
Geisler is careful to point out that the hierarchical view does
not imply that the developing child is of no value, or that abortion on demand
is justified. "An unborn baby is a work of God which He is building into
His own likeness. It is a being with increasing value as it
develops."[15] Geisler cites Psalm 139:13-15, which speaks
of God's providential care for developing human life, as evidence that the
Bible does not consider the embryo to be simply an expendable piece of human
tissue. Abortion is a very serious moral matter, much more serious than birth
control. "Since God is the Author of life, it is a serious thing to stamp
out a life which He has permitted to come to pass......Conception is a prima
facie case in favor of giving the undeveloped person a chance to develop.
One must have some higher moral duty which demands abortion before he initiates
it." [16]
When, then, in Geisler's view, is abortion morally justifiable?
He cites three fairly well-defined cases: when the life of the mother is
at stake; when the birth would result in a sub-human and not merely deformed
or retarded being; and in cases of pregnancy due to rape or incest. "When
it is a clear-cut case of either taking the life of the unborn baby or letting
the mother die, then abortion is called for."[17] In such
a case the actual life of the mother is of more value than the potential
life of the unborn child. Geisler deals with a possible objection to this
position, which can be posed in the following manner: Might some potential
humans not be more valuable than some actual human beings? A future Albert
Schweitzer than a drunken harlot? While acknowledging such a possibility,
Geisler argues that basing a decision on such considerations would require
an omniscience possessed by God alone. Finite human beings must decide on
the basis of knowledge available to them. [18]
In his discussion of anticipated birth defects, Geisler
distinguishes between cases of deformity or retardation, and cases that are
"sub-human". Only in the latter would "therapeutic" abortion be justified.
Specifically, ".....handicaps do not destroy one's humanity. In fact, they
often enhance the truly human characteristics in both the handicapped and
those who work with them."[19] Anticipated birth defects
usually do not constitute grounds for abortion. Many are minor or surgically
correctable, and the
Page 15
deformed are still human and capable of interpersonal relations. "The
handicapped are human and have the right to life. Abortion thwarts this right
in advance." [20]
Rape and incest, as Geisler acknowledges, raise difficult questions.
Is a mother obligated to give birth to a child conceived in rape? Geisler
cautiously answers no. "Birth is not morally necessitated without consent......A
violent intrusion into a woman's womb does not bring with it a moral birthright
for the embryo."[21] But what of the objection that the
embryonic human being has a right to life irrespective of the circumstances
of conception? In such cases, Geisler argues, the "rights to life, health,
and self-determination — i.e., the rights to personhood — of the
fully human mother take precedence over that [sic] of the potentially human
embryo."[22] Cases of incestuous conception may involve
both rape and genetic considerations and hence, he feels, "may provide an
even firmer basis for a justifiable abortion." [23]
There are other cases where, in Geisler's view, abortion is
clearly not justified. For example, an unplanned pregnancy where the
baby is unwanted does not constitute grounds for abortion. Consent to intercourse
implies consent to conception. "Since marriage is automatic consent to
intercourse [1 Cor. 7:3ff.].....the children conceived are automatically
willed whether they are wanted or not......In brief, any child born of
intercourse by consenting parties is implicitly willed and as such has the
right to live." [24]
Neither should abortion be considered as a "back up" to other
means of birth control. Once the choice to have intercourse has been made,
it is too late to refuse responsibility for the child that may be conceived.
Furthermore, given the ready availability of other means of fertility control,
there is no need to resort to the morally unjustifiable practice of abortion.
[25]
Geisler touches upon the problem areas of grave threats to mental
health, socioeconomic distress, and teenage pregnancies out of wedlock, but
without extensive discussion. He concludes that when all the relevant factors
are taken into account, abortion may be justified in such cases. Such
circumstances would call for Geisler's basic hierarchical framework, where
the value of the child's potential life is balanced against the mother's
actual life. "All the facts must be
Page 16
weighed and the higher value pursued. The problem is not basically a
moral one . . . but a factual one, i.e., determining as a matter of fact
which course of action will realize this higher value."
[26]
Geisler's "hierarchical" approach thus represents a fairly
sophisticated and discriminating attempt to balance the interests of both
mother and unborn child when they appear to conflict. We will evaluate this
type of approach, and its exegetical and philosophical foundations, after
we have examined the biblical data in chapter four.
Abortion "Only to Save the Life of the Mother"
A third major position, and one that is widely held in evangelical
circles, is that abortion is morally justified only in those infrequent
situations where the life of the mother would be threatened by the continuation
of the pregnancy. Such an eventuality would arise, for example, in the case
of a tubal pregnancy or cancerous uterus. In such a case, if nothing were
done, both mother and child would be in danger of perishing. Thus a therapeutic
abortion is performed to save a life that has some real prospects of
survival.
A recent expression of this position by an evangelical theologian
is found in Death Before Birth, by professor Harold O.J. Brown, formerly
of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School.[27] Professor Brown
was also instrumental in organizing the Christian Action Council, an evangelical
Protestant pro-life organization. The core of the argument contained in
Death Before Birth involves his interpretation of several key biblical
passages, the use of data concerning prenatal development, and a critique
of the utilitarian ethical framework often found in other positions.
Brown is aware that the Bible does not contain an explicit
prohibition of abortion. He observes, however, that neither does the Bible
contain explicit prohibitions of infanticide, genocide, or, for that matter,
suicide. Such specific prohibitions were unnecessary in view of the biblical
prohibition against taking innocent human life. The crucial question is whether
the Bible considers the developing fetus to be human life. "If the developing
fetus is shown to be a human being, then we do not need a specific commandment
against feticide any more than we need something specific against uxoricide
(wife killing).
Page 17
The general command against killing covers both."
[28]
Brown argues that the burden of proof in the debate over the
humanity of the fetus rests with the pro-abortionist:
With regard to the morality of killing a developing fetus, it is not enough to say that we are not sure it is human. We must be able to say we are sure it is not human. If a hunter were to see movement in a bush and shoot at it, it would not be enough for him to say he was not sure it was not another hunter. He would have to be able to say he was sure it was not. How can we be sure the fetus is not a human being? Clearly, we can not; it is far easier to be sure of the contrary, that it is. [29]
Brown is convinced that an agnostic position regarding the personal
status of the developing fetus will not do. A responsible decision requires
some credible basis for settling the question of humanity, since, at the
very least, potential human life is at stake. Brown observes that although
the Bible does not contain a technical or philosophical definition of "human
being" or "person", it significantly ".....does not make a principled distinction
between the child after birth and in the womb."[30] The
Hebrew word yeled, used of children generally, is also used of children
in the womb in Exodus 21:22. The Greek word brephos is used in Acts
7:19 to refer to the young Hebrew children slaughtered at Pharaoh's command,
and in Luke 1:41,44 to refer to John the Baptist while still in his mother's
womb. This usage suggests that the biblical writers saw a continuity between
the prenatal and postnatal states.
The biblical concept of the image of God [Gen. 1:27] is central
to the Bible's teaching concerning the dignity and value of human life, according
to Brown. Because man is made in God's own image, the shedding of innocent
blood pollutes a land and cries out to God for judgment [Num. 35:33]. "If
a nation permits the slaughter of the innocent, it surely will bring God's
judgment upon itself," warns the author. [31]
But can we be sure that the image of God is present before birth? Brown argues that if God relates in a personal way to a human creature, that is evidence that the image of God is present. "And," says Brown, "it is abundantly evident from Scripture that God relates to us and is personally concerned for us before birth."[32] He cites Psalm
Page 18
139:13,14, Jeremiah 1:5, Luke 1:44, and Psalm 51:5 as evidence:
For thou hast possessed my reins: thou hast covered me in my mother's womb. I will praise thee; for I am fearfully and wonderfully made; marvelous are thy works; and that my soul knoweth right well [Psalm 139:13,14].
Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee; and before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee, and I ordained thee a prophet unto the nations [Jeremiah 1:5].
For, lo, as soon as the voice of thy salutation sounded in mine ears, the babe leaped in my womb for joy [Luke 1:44].
Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me [Psalm 51:5].
On the basis of such texts, Brown concludes that "there can be no doubt
that God clearly says the unborn child is already a human being, made in
the image of God and deserving the protection of the
law."[33] Without involving himself in detailed questions
about the precise moment at which the image of God appears during prenatal
development, Brown concludes that the biblical data strongly opposes the
present abortion climate in America.
Brown also argues for the humanity of the unborn child on scientific
grounds. He notes that even medical authorities who favor abortion have candidly
admitted the scientific evidence for the humanity of the unborn. An editorial
in the journal California Medicine stated that the "very considerable
semantic gymnastics which are required to rationalize abortion as anything
but the taking of human life would be ludicrous if not often put forth under
socially impeccable auspices."[34] There is no medical
or scientific doubt, Brown argues, that the fetus is a human being with a
unique chromosomal identity — except in the case of identical twins,
where this genetic individuality exists at least from implantation, several
days after conception. "Admittedly, there may be some dispute as to precisely
when fetal life is 'fully human,' but everyone knows it is
a long time before birth, and the Supreme Court permits abortions right up
to the moment of birth."[35] Even if one were to adopt
a definition of "humanness" in terms of brain waves, which appear at some
point during the first trimester — and Brown does not advocate doing
so — America would
Page 19
still have to account for hundreds of thousands of homicides each year.
[36]
In Brown's view, the ethical framework for the pro-abortion
stance is a pragmatic and utilitarian one:
Make no mistake: the fundamental argument for abortion on demand is pragmatic — it works. The end justifies the means. And the end is utilitarian: the greatest good for the greatest number. In any abortion decision those who will profit from the abortion outnumber the one who will be hurt. The woman will profit, or at least thinks she will. . . . The doctor will profit because he has Medicaid, backed by HEW and the United States taxpayer, to guarantee his bill. [37]
While the principle of "the greatest good for the greatest number" can be valid in situations where proper limits and norms are already established, it cannot function as an ultimate principle overriding the sanctity of human life itself. Brown urges his readers to resist such pragmatic and utilitarian approaches on the basis of a firmly principled ethic based on the biblical teaching of the sanctity of human life made in the image of God. As image bearers of God, human beings have a transcendent dignity and worth irrespective of age, health, or physical beauty. To accept the utilitarian conception of the value of human life presupposed by abortion on demand would, in Brown's view, amount to accepting a most tragic erosion of the very basis of Western civilization.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
From this survey of representative ethical positions it has become clear that the key issue in the abortion debate concerns the personal status of the unborn child. Is the developing fetus a "person" in the usual sense of the term? How exactly is the biblical doctrine of the image of God related to the philosophical and legal concept of personhood? Does the Bible clearly indicate that personhood begins at conception, or at some other point during the process of prenatal development? Are the biblical texts cited to prove the personhood of the unborn more than poetic expressions? How do the facts of genetic identity relate to the value judgments made concerning the developing human being? Do the Scriptures indicate that the unborn
Page 20
represent potential human beings or actual human beings?
In order to establish firm answers to these questions, it will
be necessary to make a much more thorough examination of the biblical data
than has been made by the writers surveyed thus far. But first, it will be
helpful to review some of the factual information available from the medical
profession concerning prenatal development, techniques of abortion, and the
medical risks of abortion. With that data in hand, the reader will be in
a better position to consider the biblical and theological arguments.
Chapter 1 || Chapter 3 || Table of Contents
1. Joseph Fletcher, The Ethics of Genetic Control
(Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1974).
2. Ibid., pp.15, 16.
3. Ibid., pp.119, 121.
4. This approach was argued by Fletcher in his earlier work,
Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1966).
5. Fletcher, Ethics of Genetic Control, p.135.
6. Ibid., p.137.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p.139.
9. Ibid., pp.138, 139.
10. Ibid., p.142. For similar conclusions, cf. Garrett Hardin,
Mandatory Motherhood (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974).
11. Norman Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1971). Other writers who hold the "indications"
position include Daniel Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choice, and Morality
(New York: Macmillan, 1970); R.F.R. Gardner, Abortion: The Personal
Dilemma (Old Tappan, N.J.: Fleming H. Revell, 1974; Harmon L. Smith,
Ethics and the New Medicine (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970).
12. Geisler, Ethics, p.218.
13. The rather complicated questions of translation and
interpretation surrounding Exodus 21:22-25 are discussed in some detail in
chapter four of this volume. Geisler apparently has not taken fully into
account other possible interpretations of this text.
14. Geisler, Ethics, p.118.
15. Ibid., p.219.
16. Ibid., p.220.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p.221.
19. Ibid., p.222. Evidently, Geisler no longer considers
Downs Syndrome ("Mongolism") a justification for abortion.
20. Ibid., p.225.
21. Ibid., p.222.
22. Ibid., p.222,223.
23. Ibid., p.223.
24. Ibid., p.224.
25. Ibid., p.225.
26. Ibid., p.226.
27. Harold O.J. Brown, Death Before Birth (Nashville:
Thomas Nelson, 1977). Other evangelicals holding this general position include
Clifford E. Bajema, Abortion and the Meaning of Personhood (Grand
Rapids: Baker, 1974); C. Everett Koop, The Right to Live: the Right to
Die (Wheaton: Tyndale House, 1976); C.C. Ryrie, You Mean the Bible
Teaches That . . . (Chicago: Moody Press, 1974); Meredith G. Kline, "Lex
Talionis and the Human Fetus," Journal of the Evangelical Theological
Society 20, no.3 (1977): 193-202; Donald Shoemaker, Abortion, the
Bible, and the Christian (Cincinnati: Hayes, 1976); Bruce Waltke,
"Reflections from the Old Testament on Abortion," Journal of the Evangelical
Theological Society 19, no.1 (1976): 5-13. For an excellent exegetical
study, cf. John Frame et al., "Report of the Committe to Study the Matter
of Abortion," Agenda, 38th General Assembly, Orthodox Presbyterian
Church, 1971, pp.90-110.
This position is also the official position of the Roman Catholic Church.
See John T. Noonan, ed., The Morality of Abortion (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1970), pp.1-39; John Connery, Abortion: The Development
of the Roman Catholic Perspective (Chicago: Loyola University Press,
1977).
Also representative of this point of view are Baruch Brody, Abortion and
the Sancity of Life (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975); Thomas W. Hilgers and
Dennis J. Horan, eds., Abortion and Social Justice (New York: Sheed
and Ward, 1972); Paul Ramsey, "The Sanctity of Life: In the First of It,"
Dublin Review 241 (1967-68): 3-23; Dr. and Mrs. J.C. Willke, Handbook
on Abortion (Cincinnati: Hayes, 1975).
28. Brown, Death Before Birth, p.119.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p.120.
31. Ibid., p.122.
32. Ibid., p.126.
33. Ibid., p.127. Some of the criticisms raised against
this way of reading the texts, e.g., the objection that such a reading does
not take into account the metaphorical language of the Psalms, will be examined
in chapter four of this volume.
34. Cited in ibid., p.134.
35. Ibid., p.135.
36. Ibid., p.136.
37. Ibid., pp.146, 147.