A Christian ethic of abortion must be firmly grounded in
biblical principles, such as the sanctity of human life created in God's
image and likeness. Principles like that supply what is noticeably lacking
in secular discussions: a genuinely transcendent, rather than merely pragmatic
or relative, basis for recognizing the dignity and value of human life. This
chapter will begin with an examination of the biblical outlook on the value
and dignity of human life, and then consider texts that relate specifically
to prenatal human life, concluding with the personhood of the unborn.
The Sanctity of Human Life
Questions about the nature and value of prenatal life in God's
sight cannot be answered without an understanding of the biblical doctrine
of man. Foundational to that doctrine is man's creation in the image of God,
as recorded in Genesis 1:26,27:
Then God said, "Let us make man in our image, after ourEnd of Page 35 - Begin Page 36
likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth." So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.
In Genesis 9:6, the imposition of capital punishment for murder presupposes the inviolability of man's life in the sight of the Creator, precisely because man bears the divine image:
Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in his own image.
Shedding man's blood is a heinous offense for the very reason that an
attack on the bodily integrity of man is an assault on the dignity and honor
of the One who created him. [1]
Referring directly to Genesis 1:26, James writes that cursing
another human being violates God's will, inasmuch as man is made in the image
of God:
. . .no human being can tame the tongue . . . . With it we bless the Lord and Father, and with it we curse men, who are made in the likeness of God. . . . My brethren, this ought not to be so. [2]
The sacredness of human life as the divine image precludes
not only violent actions against others, but also harmful verbal
expressions.
The centuries have produced a wide range of interpretations
of the image (tselem) and the likeness (demuth) of God in
man.[3] These interpretations have generally focused on
features of man's consciousness as the seat of the imago Dei: man's
intellectual, moral, and spiritual capacities. As we shall see later, such
a view is one-sided in light of the biblical data and reflects the influence
of a Greek understanding of human nature. Here the point to be stressed is
that the biblical doctrine of the imago is primarily a relational
one.[4] Man, as imago Dei, possessing inalienable
dignity and worth, is to be understood not primarily in terms of innate
capacities or faculties — whether intellectual, moral, or spiritual
— but in terms of his unique relationship to his transcendent Creator
and covenant Lord. It is not intrinsic powers of speech, imagination, and
rational thought that
Page 37
lend transcendent worth to human nature, but man's unique calling to
live in loving fellowship with the triune God for all eternity. Thus there
is no place for a suggestion like Joseph Fletcher's, for example, that humanness
be defined in terms of such criteria as self-awareness, memory, a sense of
futurity and time, and a certain minimum I.Q.[5] That view
misses the very essence of humanness, wherein man's conscious capacities
find their true meaning, purpose, and value in that divine-human relationship
established in creation, broken by sin, and redeemed through Jesus Christ.
Definitions or evaluations based on I.Q., self-awareness, a sense of futurity,
etc., place a variable price tag on human life and deny the fundamental equality
of all human beings in the eyes of their Creator. Only the biblical doctrine
of the imago Dei provides an adequate basis for affirming the transcendent
dignity and inviolability of all human life.
The sanctity of human life is expressly guarded by the Decalogue's
prohibition of murder (Exodus 20:13; Deut. 5:17). The prohibitions of the
Decalogue not only rule out illicit acts and attitudes, but also mandate
positive actions intended for the neighbor's welfare.[6]
Thus the prohibition of murder forbids the outward act of violence, along
with the hateful and malicious intentions of the heart that give rise to
the act.[7] By ruling out thoughts and attitudes that demean
and endanger our neighbor's life, it in fact implies a positive obligation
to affirm and protect our neighbor, as circumstances and our abilities permit.
The sixth commandment thus forms an integral part of the life-affirming ethos
found throughout the Bible. Abortion on demand, the deliberate killing of
innocent prenatal human life, is clearly incompatible with that life-affirming
ethos.
Christ makes explicit the profound ethical implications of the
Decalogue in his Sermon on the Mount. The law prohibits not only the act
of adultery, but also the lustful intentions of the heart (Matt. 5:28); the
sixth commandment prohibits not only the outward destruction of a neighbor's
life, but even the attitude of contempt, which demeans his personal worth
(Matt. 5:21,22).
Christ also made it clear that God's law represents more than
negative prohibitions: it entails positive obligation to love God with all
the resources of one's personality and one's neighbor as oneself
Page 38
(Matt.22:37-40; Mark 12:30,31;Luke 10:27,28). Such love, according to
Christ's parable of the good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37), is to be understood
in an inclusive sense, extending beyond the bounds of one's normal associations
and natural sympathies. Christ challenges his disciples in this parable to
regard as "neighbors" those from whom the culture of the day might otherwise
withhold mercy and concern. Patterned on the universal benevolence of the
heavenly Father, a disciple's love is to far transcend the conventional
perception of one's "neighbor," even to include the enemy who persecutes
(Matt.5:43-48). In modern American culture the unborn child, like the man
in the parable, all too often falls prey to unexpected assaults on his life.
Our Lord's teachings challenge us to ask whether neighbor-love ought to extend
even to the unborn children of the world.
Christ's attitude toward children cuts at the very root of the
contemporary abortion ethos. While his disciples felt that the young children
and infants brought to him (Matt. 19:13-15; Mark 10:13-16; Luke 18:15-17)
were not important enough to demand his time and attention, Jesus' actions
proved otherwise. The disciples apparently did not regard the young children
and infants as persons "in the whole sense." But Jesus did, and all three
Synoptic writers included the incident in their accounts, which were intended
to shape the thoughts and attitudes of the church. Elsewhere, Jesus presented
a child as the very paradigm of a citizen of the kingdom of heaven (Matt.
18:1-4; Mark 9:33-37; Luke 9:46-48). The child's dependence on his parents
for life and security is a vivid illustration of the believer's utter dependence
on God. Christ's words and actions pose a sharp challenge to conventional
ways of assessing human worth. As with economics, so with our evaluations
of others: "What is exalted among men is an abomination in the sight of God"
(Luke 16:15). In the wake of a rapid shift from a Spockean, child-centered
focus during the postwar era to a careerist, contraceptive, anti-childbearing,
and abortifacient mentality, Jesus' words should challenge anew our perceptions
of both money and children.
Current attitudes toward the unwanted unborn child are also
suspect in light of the frequent biblical injunctions to show compassion
toward the fatherless, the widow, and the sojourner
Page 39
(Deut. 10:18; 14:29; Ps. 10:14; Isa. 1:17; Jer. 49:11). Israel was commanded
to recall her own distress during the Egyptian captivity and identify with
the special human needs within her own boundaries. The God of Israel executes
justice for the fatherless and the widow, loves the sojourner, and gives
him food and clothing (Deut. 10:18). Israel's God was concerned about precisely
those whom the culture was prone to neglect as having little value. God's
concern for the fatherless challenges both the de facto abandonment of paternal
responsibility by many American fathers, and by implication the widespread
abandonment of maternal responsibility toward the unborn. Abortion may well
be the ultimate rejection of parental responsibility and compassion for one's
own offspring. It is likewise an ultimate denial of the transcendent value
of an unborn human being. But God's values are not man's values. Society
may neglect the fatherless, but he does not. To manifest his own glory and
goodness, he chooses what is low and despised in the world, "even things
that are not, to bring to nothing things that are, so that no human being
might boast in the presence of God" (1 Cor. 1:28,29). There could hardly
be a more fitting paradigm of the electing love of God than today's unwanted
unborn child, rejected by the culture, but valued in the sight of God.
God's standards are a striking contrast to the contemporary
criterion of "viability" as a measure of the worth of the unborn child. Contrary
to the view that an "unviable" infant is less valuable than a "viable" one,
the Bible depicts human weakness, dependency, and helplessness as what most
fully manifest the love of God for the wretched of the earth. The Son of
God came to minister to the weak and heal the sick. While some propose that
severely handicapped infants be left to die from neglect,[8]
God's Messiah would not break a bruised reed or quench a smoldering wick
(Isa.42:3; Matt. 12:20). In God's sight no human being is completely "viable"
in the sense of having mastery over his own life or the independent capacity
to overcome the dominion and guilt of sin; and yet it is in human weakness
that the power of God is made perfect (2 Cor. 12:9). The God of Israel does
not judge human worth on the basis of age, size, physical appearance, or
"viability" (cf. 1 Sam. 16:7). By his sovereign grace, God can demonstrate
his glory even in unwanted infants
Page 40
with birth defects such as blindness and deafness (cf. Exod. 4:11; John
9:3).
The Personhood of the Unborn Child
Perhaps the most crucial question for a Christian regarding
abortion is whether God considers the unborn child a person. This questions
takes precedence over essentially pragmatic considerations such as socioeconomic
distress, mental anguish, and illegitimacy. If the Scriptures clearly imply
the personhood of the unborn, then Christians have an obligation to seek
the protection of the unborn through educational, religious, and legislative
action. Our examination of the biblical data will consider five kinds of
texts: (1) those where personal pronouns and proper names are used to refer
to the unborn; (2) texts that speak of a personal relationship between God
and the unborn child; (3) provisions in the Mosaic law relating to the unborn,
particularly Exodus 21:22-25; (4) texts reflecting the psycho-physical unity
of man created in the imago Dei; and (5) those dealing with the
incarnation of Christ. Finally, a number of objections to the personhood
of the unborn will be examined.
Personal Language Applied to the Unborn
In a number of texts the biblical writers freely apply personal
language to the unborn child. Genesis 4:1 says that "Adam knew Eve his wife,
and she conceived and bore Cain." The writer's interest in Cain extends back
beyond his birth, to his conception. That is when his personal history begins.
The individual conceived and the individual born are one and the same, namely
Cain. His conception, birth, and postnatal life form a natural continuum,
with the God of covenant involved at every stage. Genesis 5:3 states that
when Adam had lived 130 years he "begat a son in his own likeness, after
his image; and called his name Seth" (KJV). In the opening verse of this
chapter, which constitutes the "book of the generations of Adam," is a reference
to man's creation in the likeness of God. From Genesis 5:3 it seems clear
that human reproduction was the means by which the image and likeness of
Adam were transmitted
Page 41
to Seth. A personal continuity between father and son is here linked
to bodily existence, sexuality, and prenatal life.
In the third chapter of Job we find Job cursing the day of his
birth in the following words: "Let the day perish wherein I was born, and
the night which said, 'A man-child [geber] is conceived' "(Job 3:3).
Again we find a basic continuity between the individual born and the individual
conceived. Job traces his personal history back beyond his birth to the night
of his conception. The process of conception is described by the biblical
writer in personal terms. There is no abstract language of the "products
of conception," but the concrete language of humanity. The Hebrew word
geber, generally used in a postnatal context and translated
"man," "male," or "husband" (e.g., Ps. 34:9; 52:9; 94:12; Prov. 6:34), is
here freely applied from the moment of conception.
Psalm 51, David's psalm of penitence, is an especially important
text for our discussion, particularly verse 5:
Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me.
Professor E.R. Dalglish, in his authoritative work on Psalm 51, comments,
"In Psalm 51:7 [English v. 5] the psalmist is relating his sinfulness to
the very inception of life; he traces his development beyond his birth to
the genesis of his being in his mother's womb — even to the very hour
of conception."[9] In confessing his personal guilt for
his adultery with Bathsheba, David traces his involvement with sin to the
very beginnings of his existence. This application of moral and spiritual
categories to David as a conceptus suggests a relationship to God and the
moral law even in his embryonic state.
In the next verse David goes on to confess that already in his mother's
womb the moral law of God was present with him. According to the King James
Version the text of Psalm 51:6 reads, "Behold, thou desirest truth in the
inward parts: and in the hidden part thou shalt make me know wisdom." Waltke,
following the suggestion of Dalglish, argues that the Hebrew words rendered
"inward parts" (tehoth) and "hidden part" (satem) properly
refer not to David's body, but rather to his mother's
womb.[10] This interpretation is supported by the close
connection of verse 6 with verse 5,
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which clearly refers to conception and birth, and by a comparison of
verse 6 with Psalm 139:15, where similar poetic language refers to God's
secret activity in the womb. Thus both Dalglish and Waltke understand Psalm
51:6 to say that even in his prenatal state David was being taught the moral
law of God. Dalglish translates the verse as follows: "Behold, truth thou
desirest in the inward (being); and in the secret (part) wisdom thou teachest
me."[11] He summarizes, ". . . the psalmist knows full
well the divine desire for truth to be a moral imperative even in the formative
stages of his being within his mother's womb . . . and is conscious that
even there wisdom was taught him, i.e., in his embryological state . . .
the moral law was inscribed within his being."[12] Thus
the reference to sin in 51:5 suggests an already existing relationship to
the moral law of God. David speaks as though his relationship to God extends
back even to the hour of conception.
One of the most striking Old Testament passages to attribute
personal characteristics to the unborn is Psalm 139:13-16:
13) For thou didst form my inward parts, Thou didst knit me together in my mother's womb. 14) I praise thee, for thou are fearful and wonderful. Wonderful are thy works! Thou knowest me right well. 15) My frame was not hidden from thee, when I was being made in secret, intricately wrought in the depths of the earth. 16) Thy eyes beheld my unformed substance; in thy book were written, every one of them, the days that were formed for me, when as yet there was none of them.
Having earlier in the psalm spoken of God's omniscience (vv.1-6) and omnipresence (vv.7-12), David now focuses on God's intimate knowledge of and creative involvement with his prenatal development. David's praise, spoken from a postnatal perspective (v. 14), assumes his identity with the prenatal individual described in verses 13, 15, and 16. He says, "Thou didst knit me together in my mother's womb" (v.13), and similarly, "I was being made in secret"
Page 43
(v.15). David naturally acknowledges his personal history and identity
to have begun in the womb. His language suggests that his personal identity
is not restricted to his conscious memory, but extends back beyond conscious
recollections, to the earliest time of God's creative control of his prenatal
development. These verses strongly imply that personal identity is a continuum,
beginning in the womb and extending naturally into postnatal life.
[13]
Two possible objections to this prenatal "personalization" may
arise. The first is that David's language is merely poetic and therefore
precludes strict conclusions concerning the personhood of the unborn. The
second objection is that verses 13-16 deal solely with divine foreknowledge
and have nothing to say on the personal character of prenatal life. Since
these objections are not without weight, one must be cautious in drawing
inferences from such personal pronouns.
In the New Testament, Luke in particular is sensitive to the
development of the unborn. In chapter 1, Elizabeth greets her visiting cousin
Mary with these words: "Behold, when the voice of your greeting came to my
ears, the babe in my womb leaped for joy" (Luke 1:44). Two elements are
noteworthy here.
First, John the Baptist in his mother's womb leaped for
joy in response to Mary's greeting. Human emotion is explicitly attributed
to the unborn John. His mother Elizabeth was probably still in her sixth
month, since it seems likely that Mary's visit followed closely upon the
announcement by the angel Gabriel (cf. Luke 1:36,39). Elizabeth's statement
should not be dismissed as poetic hyperbole, since Luke specifies that Elizabeth
was speaking under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit (Luke 1:41). Furthermore,
it is now well known that an unborn child can respond to touch at eight weeks
and at 25 weeks can respond to human voices and feel pain and
discomfort.[14] There is no scientific basis for precluding
human emotion in John the Baptist at that stage of his prenatal life.
A second point worthy of note is the use of the term
brephos to describe John in the womb. Elsewhere in the New Testament
the same term is used freely of infants and the newly born (Luke 18:15; 1
Pet. 2:2; Acts 7:19). Here again we have language indicating an understood
continuity between prenatal and postnatal existence.
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Such instances do not in themselves constitute proof of
the personhood of the unborn child from conception. Nevertheless, they combine
with other lines of biblical evidence to form a total outlook pointing in
that direction.
God's Relationship to the Unborn
A second category of biblical texts appears to give evidence
of personal relationships between God and the unborn. The capacity for such
relationships with God is precisely the foundational element of personhood,
the key distinction between man and the rest of creation. If such relationships
exist between God and the unborn, that would strongly imply their
personhood.
Texts dealing with such relationships are bound to overlap some
discussed in the previous section, especially Psalm 139:13-16. The other
major Old Testament text where God's creative and sustaining involvement
with embryonic human life is explicit is Job 10:8-12:
8) Thy hands fashioned and made me; and now thou does turn about and destroy me. 9) Remember that thou has made me of clay; and wilt thou turn me to dust again? 10) Didst thou not pour me out like milk and curdle me like cheese? 11) Thou didst clothe me with skin and flesh, and knit me together with bones and sinews. 12) Thou hast granted me life and steadfast love; and thy care has preserved my spirit.
As in Psalm 139:13-16, the development of prenatal human life is understood not as a blind natural process, but as God's creative and sustaining effort. In the scriptural view, as Delitzsch observes, "A creative act similar to the creation of Adam is repeated at the origin of each individual; and the continuation of development according to natural laws is not less the working of God that the creative planting of the very beginning."[15] In verse 9 there is an allusion to Genesis 2:7 and the formation of clay into a vessel by the potter's hand. "The figure is that of a potter who has lavished infinite care upon his vessel, and now reduces his work of elaborate skill and
Page 45
exquisite ornament into dust again."[16] Job feels
that his present distress is inconsistent with God's previous care for him
from the very beginnings of life. The figure of the potter and the clay,
elsewhere used in a postnatal context (as in Jer. 18:5,6 and Rom. 9:20ff.),
is here applied to Job's prenatal existence. As in Psalm 139:13-16, the inspired
writer identifies himself with the prenatal work of God's hands: "Thy hands
fashioned and made me . . . .thou has made me of clay." Job's
language of personal identity reaches back into his mother's womb.
In verses 10 and 11 Job likens his formation to the curdling
of cheese and the process of weaving or plaiting. "Semen, poured like milk
into the mother's womb, is wrapped in flesh and woven together by God into
a human embryo."[17] The "steadfast love" (v.12;
hesed) that Job has known throughout his life began with God's special
providential care in the womb. Hesed, a key word in Old Testament
theology, and applied here to the unborn Job, speaks particularly of Yahweh's
covenantal relationship."[18] Even in his mother's womb
Job is shown the same hesed extended by God in covenantal relationships
to Abraham (Gen. 24:27), Jacob (Gen. 32:10), David (2 Sam. 13:20, LXX), and
Israel (cf. Ps.98:3). In both Psalm 139:13-16 and Job 10:8-12 God's personal
involvement in creation and providence personalizes the unborn and provides
the foundation for the later conscious enjoyment of that covenant relationship
by the people of God. Just as in the redemptive sphere God's sovereign work
of regeneration logically precedes the response of faith and repentance,
so in the natural sphere God's creative and providential work in the womb
is the precondition for life itself. Personhood, whether "natural" or redeemed,
is not a possibility intrinsic to man, but comes from God's sovereign initiative.
"In him we live and move and have our being" (Acts 17:28) —both prenatally
and postnatally. If it is true that "we love, because he first loved us"
(1 John 4:19), it seems reasonable to say that we are persons because God
first related to us in a personal way. Human personhood is rooted in the
creative and providential care of God, which begins in the womb.
We have seen in Psalm 51:5 that the language of sin is applied
to
Page 46
prenatal life. The repentant David realizes that his sin is not a superficial problem, limited to his outward act of adultery, but pervades the very core of his being. The pervasive depravity of human nature, elsewhere spoken of in a postnatal context (e.g., Rom. 7:7ff; Eph. 2:3), is here traced back to David's prenatal state. This notion of estrangement from God at the very earliest stages of life is not unique to Psalm 51:5, as the following texts show:
The wicked go astray from the womb, they err from their birth, speaking lies (Psalm 58:3)
Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? There is not one (Job 14:4).
What is man, that he can be clean? or he that is born of woman, that he can be righteous? (Job 15:4).
How then can man be righteous before God? How can he who is born of woman be clean? (Job 25:4)
In biblical thought sin is a universal phenomenon pervading every aspect
of man's fallen being and present prior to his conscious sinful acts. Without
attempting to explain in detail the "riddle of iniquity," David took
responsibility for the full measure of his sin, not even excluding his prenatal
life from his complicity in sin.
A number of biblical texts indicate that the unborn can be the
subjects of God's election and calling. While Jacob and Esau were still in
the womb of their mother Rebekah, the Lord declared to her, concerning their
future,
Two nations are in your womb and two peoples, born of you, shall be divided; the one shall be stronger than the other, the elder shall serve the younger.
By God's sovereign choice, Jacob, while still in the womb, is given preeminence over his brother Esau and made the bearer of God's special covenant promises. Jacob's personal involvement in covenant history thus begins before birth. The struggling of the children within Rebekah's womb (Gen. 25:22) anticipates the postnatal conflict between Jacob and Esau, and the later strife between Israel and
Page 47
Edom as nations. Thus both as prenatal antagonists and as subjects of
divine decree of election, Jacob and Esau before birth are recognized
as actors in the drama of redemption.
The apostle Paul in Romans 9 cites the Genesis 25 text in connection
with God's electing purpose. What distinguishes elect from nonelect, according
to Paul, is not mere physical descent from Abraham, but the sovereign purpose
of God expressed in the promise:
. . . when Rebecca had conceived children by one man, our forefather Isaac, though they were not yet born and had done nothing either good or bad, in order that God's purpose of election might continue, not because of works but because of his call, she was told, "The elder will serve the younger." As it is written, "Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated." (Romans 9:10-13).
This text makes it clear that Jacob is elected for covenant blessings
prior to birth, and prior to any conscious faith, repentance, or works on
his part. The normal ways in which human beings qualify themselves for privileges
of various sorts — through personal initiative, planning, foresight,
organizational ability, concentrated effort, etc. — are here clearly
excluded. The usual marks of "personhood" are here absent: physical development,
speech, social relationships, ability to work, relative independence. In
spite of this, however, in order to display all the more clearly the sovereign
initiative in election, God chooses to establish the most crucial of all
personal relationships — the one between a man and his Creator —
prior to Jacob's birth.
God is no "respecter of persons." In electing some to special
covenant privileges, he does not employ the usual human standards. Paul made
this point very clear to the Corinthian church:
For consider your call, brethren; not many of you were wise according to worldly standards, not many were powerful, not many were of noble birth; but God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong. God chose what is low and despised in the world, even things that are not, to bring to nothing things that are, so that no human being might boast in the presence of God. (1Cor. 1:26-29).
Page 48
God's ways are not our ways, and his perceptions of personhood are different
from ours. It is precisely in God's choice of the "foolish" and the "weak,"
the "low and despised," and even "things that are not" (ta me onta)
that his mercy and grace are thrown into sharpest relief. Both the postnatal
application of divine election in 1 Corinthians 1:26-29 and the prenatal
reference in Genesis 25:23 upset the usual human expectations of who qualifies
for a privileged relationship with God. God's election of the weak and the
dependent challenges us to reevaluate our culturally determined views of
the unborn in the light of divine revelation. Even the unwanted child can
be the object of an everlasting covenant love. God's electing love, not the
shifting sands of cultural convention, should constitute the basis for defining
human personhood.
Several biblical texts portray the unborn as recipients of a
special calling and consecration to God's service. Perhaps the most familiar
is Jeremiah 1:5:
Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you; I appointed you a prophet to the nations.
When the word of the Lord comes to Jeremiah, calling him to be a prophet
to the nations, Jeremiah protests that he is only a youth (Jer.1:6). God's
reply indicates that age and experience, credentials normally necessary for
tasks of great responsibility, are transcended by God's sovereign purpose
to equip Jeremiah for his task (Jer.1:8). God was actively preparing Jeremiah
for that task even before birth, having foreknown the course of his life
even prior to Jeremiah's conception.
Jeremiah is not an isolated example. In Judges 13:2-7 we read that
Samson was consecrated to be a Nazirite to God prior to his birth. Both his
conception and consecration are described as acts not of parental will, but
of the Lord's sovereign determination. In Isaiah 49:1,5 the servant of the
Lord, in a prophecy that looks forward to Christ, declares, "The Lord called
me from the womb, from the body of my mother he named my name. . . . the
Lord . . . who formed me from the womb to be his servant. . . ." John the
Baptist, prior to his birth, was given a name and set apart to be the
prophet
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who prepares the way for the Messiah (Luke 1:13-17). The angel of the
Lord, appearing in a dream to Joseph, while the child was still in Mary's
womb, announced that his name was to be Jesus (Matt. 1:18-25). And the apostle
Paul declares that he had been set apart for God's service before he was
born (Gal.1:15).
All these texts indicate that God's special dealings with human
beings can long precede their awareness of a personal relationship with God.
God deals with human beings in an intensely personal way long before society
is accustomed to treat them as persons in the "whole sense." As with divine
election, so with calling and consecration to service: God's actions present
a striking contrast to current notions of personhood.
The biblical texts we have surveyed show that categories normally
applied to postnatal man are applied also to the unborn. Again, while some
allowance must be made for the possibly metaphorical nature of such biblical
statements, it is hard to resist the impression that God takes a deep interest
in the unborn child. Even without constituting a strict proof of the personhood
of the unborn child — at least in the very earliest stages of pregnancy
— these texts do challenge traditional views of personhood. Far from
showing that the unborn are less than persons, these texts appear,
in fact, to point in the opposite direction.
Exodus 21:22-25
Professor Meredith Kline has observed that "the most significant
thing about abortion legislation in the Biblical law is that there is none.
It was so unthinkable that an Israelite woman should desire an abortion that
there was no need to mention this offense in the criminal
code."[19] Nevertheless, there is a passage in the Mosaic
code that sheds light on the status of the unborn child in Old Testament
law. This text, Exodus 21:22-25, has been the subject of considerable attention
and, not surprisingly, a number of competing interpretations.
The translators of the Revised Standard Version assume that
a miscarriage is in view and translate the passage as follows:
22) When men strive together, and hurt a woman with child, soPage 50
that there is a miscarriage, and yet no harm follows, the one who hurt her shall be fined, according as the woman's husband shall lay upon him; and he shall pay as the judges determine. 23) If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, 24) eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, 25) burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.
The King James Version, however, allows for the possibility of a premature live birth:
22) "If men strive, and hurt a woman with child, so that her fruit depart from her, and yet no mischief follows, he shall surely be punished, according as the woman's husband will lay upon him; and he shall pay as the judges determine. 23) And if any mischief follows, then thou shalt give life for life. . . .
The phrase "so that her fruit depart" of the KJV is a more literal rendering
of the Hebrew than the RSV's "so that there is a miscarriage." The New
International Version also takes the passage to refer to a premature live
birth.
For the sake of convenience we will designate the two most common
lines of interpretation simply as "Position I" and "Position II." The
circumstances described in verse 22 will be designated as "Case A", and the
circumstances of verses 23-25 designated as "Case B". Those who adopt Position
I take Case A to mean that if a pregnant woman suffers a nonfatal injury
in the strife, and as a result suffers a miscarriage, then monetary compensation
is to be rendered for the loss of the child and for the woman's injury. Case
B is taken to mean that if, in addition to the miscarriage, the woman is
fatally injured, then the provisions of the lex talionis apply, and
capital punishment may be in view.[20] On this view, the
lack of a capital penalty for causing the death of the unborn child by
miscarriage would suggest that Old Testament law placed a higher value on
the life of the mother than on the life of the unborn child. If so, it is
argued, then difficult circumstances might justify taking the life of the
child through deliberate abortion as the lesser of two evils.
Those who adopt Position II argue that the "miscarriage" translation
is inaccurate.[21] They believe that Case A refers not
to a miscarriage but to a premature live birth. In Case A, the child is born
alive,
Page 51
and the woman sustains a nonfatal injury. Monetary compensation is rendered
for the trauma of premature birth and for any harm suffered by the woman.
In Case B, the "harm" (ason) is taken to refer to either mother or
child. The death of either mother or child comes under the rule of the lex
talionis, and the assailant is subject to the capital penalty. On this
view, the Mosaic law makes no distinction between the value of the life of
the mother and that of the unborn child. The loss of either life comes within
the purview of the lex talionis. Position II, then, sees Exodus 21:22-25
as teaching the full legal status of the unborn child as a human life (v.23b).
That would make Exodus 21:22-25 in fact a very strong anti-abortion
passage.
Interpreters who hold Position II point out a number of exegetical
difficulties involved in Position I. The verb translated "depart" or "come
out" (yatsa) usually refers in the Old Testament to live
birth.[22] The usual Hebrew verb for miscarriage
(shakol), found in Exodus 23:26 and Hosea 9:14, is not used in Exodus
21:22. Furthermore, the term yeled in verse 22, "child" or "fruit,"
is not the usual Old Testament designation for the product of a miscarriage.
In such cases of the death of an unborn child the designation nefel,
"one untimely born" (Job 3:16; Ps.58:8; Eccles. 6:3), is used. Thus the
linguistic evidence favors the view that verse 22 indicates not an accidental
miscarriage, but rather a premature live birth.
More recently, Meredith G. Kline has offered an exegesis of
Exodus 21:22-25, which we may designate "Position III."[23]
While Kline's exegesis agrees with Position 2 that the life of the unborn
child is granted a legal status equal to the mother's, the exegetical route
by which he establishes that conclusion differs from that of Position II
and, I believe, is more adequate. In Kline's view, Case A refers to the following
circumstances: The child is born prematurely, but alive and uninjured; the
woman experiences a fatal injury. In such a case the assailant must render
a monetary compensation in the amount demanded by the husband. In Case B,
if the child suffers calamitous injury or death, the penalty must be a just
monetary compensation. Thus Position III holds that Case A refers to injuries
to the mother alone, and Case B to injuries to the child alone. In either
case, the law treats a fatal injury as a case of negligent manslaughter,
for which monetary compensation may be rendered as a
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substitute for the forfeiture of life (cf. the case of the goring ox
in Exodus 21:29,30).
Kline observes that the force of the verb nagaph ("smite";
RSV, "hurt") has not been adequately noticed by previous commentators. This
verb and its derivatives can refer to fatal divine judgments (1 Sam. 25:38;
26:10) or to slaughter in battle (Judg. 20:35; 1 Sam. 4:3). In Exodus 21:35,
the term describes the fatal attack of one ox by another, goring ox. Thus
there is good linguistic reason to hold that the injury to the mother in
verse 22 is a fatal one.
Notice should also be taken of the unusual term ason
("harm," RSV). In the only other biblical context where the term is found,
a serious injury or even death is denoted. There Jacob fears that grievous
calamity might befall Benjamin on the journey to Egypt (cf. Gen. 42:4,38;
44:9). Such an unusual word would be appropriate for the somewhat unusual
circumstance of prenatal death by violently induced miscarriage, but less
so for the death or injury of the woman. In the latter case, the more usual
terminology would be expected. Thus, the meanings of nagaph and
ason give further support to the view that the death of the child
by induced miscarriage is not in view in verse 22.
Position III, I am convinced, is the preferable exegesis of
Exodus 21:22-25. Both Positions II and III agree that Exodus 21:22-25, far
from justifying permissive abortion, in fact grant the unborn child a status
in the eyes of the law equal to the mother's. The passage is thus consistent
with the high regard for prenatal life manifested elsewhere in Scripture.
Man as Animated Flesh
The relation of the physical and spiritual aspects of man's
nature is very relevant to the status of the unborn before
God.[24] The older questions concerning the time of ensoulment
and whether the child receives his soul from his parents (traducianism) or
by the immediate creative activity of God (creationism) have their secular
counterparts in the contemporary abortion debate. They now reappear as questions
about the time at which the unborn child becomes a "person," whether at
conception, implantation, formation of the
Page 53
cerebral cortex, "quickening," viability, or
birth.[25] All but the first of these suggestions, conception,
separate to some degree personhood from biologically human existence. They
suggest a dualistic understanding of man that has more kinship with Greek
and certain modern European philosophies than with the biblical outlook.
For Plato, the body was the prison house of the soul. Aristotle's theory
of ensoulment postulated a developing sequence of nutritive, sensitive, and
rational souls, the latter being infused at the fortieth day in the case
of a male and at the eightieth day in the case of a female. Descartes'
distinction of "thinking substances" and "extended substances" as applied
to man has led to the impasse of a mind-body dualism that has plagued modern
philosophy for centuries. Modern thought is still haunted by dualistic and
mechanistic images of man.
All such dualisms are fundamentally foreign to the biblical
outlook. As John A.T. Robinson has observed, in Old Testament theology, "Man
does not have a body, he is a body. He is flesh-animated-by-soul,
the whole conceived as a psycho-physical unity."[26] Similarly,
Edmond Jacob states that, in Old Testament anthropology, "Man is always seen
in his totality, which is quickened by a unitary life. The unity of human
nature is not expressed by the antithetical concepts of body and soul but
by the complementary and inseparable concepts of body and
life."[27] The essence of human personality is not man's
spiritual or intellectual capacities in distinction from his "lower" physical
nature. The Greek tendency to deprecate the body and to disassociate it from
man's personality conflicts with biblical thought. Man's flesh (basar)
and his soul (nephesh) are not dichotomized entities thrown together
in accidental association, but are complementary aspects of a unified psychomatic
being. Man as a whole can be characterized as either basar or
nephesh. Both biblical terms express his total creaturely dependence
on God in all the aspects of his existence.
The Old Testament's unitary conception of man is also a key
to understanding man as the imago Dei. Recent Old Testament scholarship
has shown a concern to correct previous tendencies to exclude man's body
as a legitimate expression of the imago. As Gerhard von Rad comments,
the image (tselem) and likeness (demuth) "refer to the whole
man and do not relate solely to his spiritual
Page 54
and intellectual being."[28] Though man's intellectual,
moral, and spiritual capacities are of course crucial, the image of God extends
beyond them, to his total existence as a psycho-physical unity. Such a view
provides an adequate framework for understanding a text like Genesis 5:3,
which describes the seminal transmission of the image from Adam to his son
Seth. If the imago were restricted to man's conscious mental capacities,
it would be difficult to understand how such a statement could be meaningful.
In terms of the more holistic understanding of man found in the Bible, however,
such a text points to the transcendent value and dignity conferred on man
from the very first moments of his bodily existence.
The New Testament anthropology presupposes and builds on the
Old Testament view of man as a psychosomatic unity. There is no dualism of
body and spirit, not even in Paul's prominent contrast between "flesh"
(sarx) and "spirit" (pneuma).[29] That is
made clear by such texts as Romans 8:6, where Paul speaks of the mind of
the flesh; 1 Corinthians 3:3, where carnality is associated with jealousy
and envy; and Galatians 5:19ff., where the "works of the flesh" include idolatry,
sorcery, and envy. The body in Pauline thought is not merely the external
casing of the real, inner man, but rather the man himself considered in a
certain mode of his existence.[30] Paul exhorts the Roman
Christians, "Present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable
to God, which is your spiritual service" (Rom.12:1). In dealing with
antinomian tendencies in Corinth that tended to dichotomize the life of the
body and one's relationship to Christ, Paul reminded the church that the
body was not for immorality, but for the Lord (1Cor. 6:13). The believer
serves the Lord with his entire being. Instead of being of lesser worth than
the spiritual self, the body is in fact a temple of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor.
6:19), and the believer is to glorify God in his body (1 Cor. 6:20). Thus
the Old Testament revelation of man's dignity as the imago Dei is
deepened and enriched by the New Testament portrayal of the believer's
body.
The biblical conceptions of the goodness of human bodily life
and man's essential unity should make us very suspicious of attempts to restrict
human personhood — and hence moral and legal protection — to those
among whom man's "higher," rational capacities are
Page 55
evident. Man is to be valued not merely as a "thinking substance," but
as the bearer of the transcendent image of God — an image that includes
the bodily aspects of life. In biblical thought, man's "personal" life is
not separated from his bodily life. He is animated flesh, and where there
is animated human flesh, there man is. Consequently, this consideration of
the biblical understanding of man as a psycho-physical unity, again leads
us to question approaches that define personhood in purely mental or
psychological terms.
The Incarnation
The incarnation of Christ carries implications for the personhood
of the unborn. The most important text in this connection is the account
of the annunciation and Mary's visit to Elizabeth, recorded in Luke 1:26-56.
[31]
In verse 31 Luke records the words of the angel Gabriel to Mary:
"You will conceive in your womb and bear a son, and you shall call his name
Jesus." The inspired account of the Messiah's personal history includes the
prediction not only of his birth, but also of his conception. As in other
biblical texts, conception is treated as the time at which one's personal
history begins. The mention of human conception some forty times in the Scripture
indicates in itself the significance of this event in God's dealings with
his people.
Luke 1:39,40 tells us that "in those days Mary arose and went
with haste into the hill country, to a city of Judah, and she entered the
house of Zechariah and greeted Elizabeth." Several factors indicate that
there was little delay between the prediction of Mary's conception (vv. 31-35)
and her arrival at the house of Zechariah and Elizabeth. Elizabeth was already
in her sixth month prior to Mary's visit (v. 36), and Mary stayed with Elizabeth
for about three months prior to the birth of John (v. 56). If there had been
a considerable delay, say a month or two between the time of the annunciation
and the visit to Elizabeth, then Mary could not have spent those three months
with Elizabeth prior to John's birth. Furthermore, we are told that Mary
"arose and went with haste" (v.39). That puts Mary in the very earliest stages
of her pregnancy when she arrived at Elizabeth's. While the exact time cannot
be determined, it is reasonable
Page 56
to assume that Mary had been pregnant for less than a month, perhaps
only for a week or two. This consideration is significant in view of several
details in the conversation between Elizabeth and Mary.
When Mary's greeting reached Elizabeth, the baby John leaped
in his mother's womb (vv.41,44). Was John's response, prompted by the Holy
Spirit, primarily to Mary, or to the unborn Messiah? Since John's mission
in life was to bear witness to the Messiah and to prepare the people to receive
him (Luke 1:17; John 1:6-8, 19-23;3:28-30), John's response may well have
been his first acknowledgment of the Messiah; John's status and role in the
covenant history is found in his relationship not to Mary, but to the Messiah.
That would place the focus of John's response on Jesus in the very earliest
stages of the Messiah's prenatal existence. Thus the passage seems to indicate
the humanity of Jesus in his embryonic state, perhaps even prior to the time
of implantation in the uterus at approximately two weeks.
There may be a number of objections to this type of argument
for the humanity of Jesus as a conceptus. It might also be objected that
John's response had a purely future significance. The same futuristic
interpretation might be placed on the words of Elizabeth in verse 43: "And
why is this granted me, that the mother of my Lord should come to
me?"[32] But Mary is already pregnant. The process by which
the angel's prediction is to become a reality is already under way. When
Elizabeth, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, declares to Mary, "Blessed
are you among women, and blessed is the fruit of your womb" (v. 42), Elizabeth
describes a present state of blessedness enjoyed by Mary. Elizabeth's
words form a noteworthy parallelism between the blessing pronounced upon
Mary and the blessing pronounced on the fruit of her womb, thereby appearing
to personalize the latter, the unborn Messiah.
A second objection argues that the circumstances of Jesus'
conception were so unusual that no parallels can be drawn to the normal process
of human conception. While Jesus' conception was certainly unique, it does
not follow that his prenatal existence offers no parallels to our own. As
to his human nature, the New Testament
Page 57
expressly declares that he was made like his brethren in every respect (Heb. 2:14,17), sin excepted. The Last Adam (1Cor. 15:45) is the archetype of the human race. While the mode of Jesus' conception was unique, the results of that conception, as regards the integrity of the human nature, were identical to our own. His human nature, in the language of Chalcedon, is "consubstantial" with our own. As Jesus later sanctified the grave for his people in his death, so he sanctified the womb in his incarnation.
Other Objections and Replies
Among other objections to the position that personhood begins
in early prenatal life, one difficulty is that the unborn lack conscious
awareness and memory, which are usually associated with personal identity.
The Cartesian dictum, "I think, therefore I am," illustrates the common tendency
in much modern philosophy to identify the self with the conscious exercise
of its rational capacities. Though that association is natural, a number
of considerations prevent us from reducing our sense of selfhood and personal
identity to our conscious experiences. Few if any of us have distinct
recollection of our lives between birth and age two; yet it would be silly
to insist that we were not persons during that time and even more outrageous
to argue that the protection of the law should be withheld on such grounds.
A person may suffer partial or even total amnesia, but the absence of conscious
recollection is no warrant for declaring him a "nonperson" in the eyes of
the law. Likewise, the lack of conscious recollections of our prenatal life
does not mean we were subhuman before birth. Personhood cannot be reduced
to conscious experiences. Our ability to have conscious experiences and
recollections arises out of our personhood; the basic metaphysical reality
of personhood precedes the unfolding of the conscious abilities inherent
in it. The fertilized human egg already possesses the capacity for becoming
a conscious human being, whereas the unfertilized egg or sperm does
not.
Here we may suggest a somewhat technical and philosophical
definition of personhood: a person is an individual subsistence in a human
nature. An individual subsistence exists in and for itself rather
Page 58
than merely as part of a larger whole. Thus, for example, the human
heart, while being a recognizably individualized organ of the human body,
does not constitute an individual subsistence, but is part of a larger
whole. The newly fertilized human ovum, on the other hand, is not merely
part of the mother's body, but is a distinct, individual entity, possessing
its own chromosomal identity and unique "life trajectory." The union of a
human sperm and egg gives rise to a new individual with a biologically
human nature: this is the clear witness of the modern genetics. Thus,
it is proper to apply the concept of person to a human being from
the time of conception. [33]
Terminology such as "subsistence" may strike some readers as
being unnecessarily philosophical and abstract. In the present abortion debate,
however, such "metaphysical" considerations as the exact meaning of "personhood"
are at the very heart of the matter. As in the christological and trinitarian
controversies in the early church, where the philosophical categories of
"essence," "nature," and "person" were prominent, it is sometimes necessary
to use terms not found in Scripture in order to explain the true meaning
of Scripture and avoid distortion. In the abortion controversy, a technical,
philosophical term such as "subsistence" may help us to integrate scriptural
principles and the genetic data in a proper concept of human personhood.
The obvious differences in appearance between the unborn
during very early pregnancy and the normal human adult have led some to question
the personhood of the unborn. This objection assumes that personhood presupposes
a postnatal human form. A little reflection, however, will show that the
concept of a "human form" is a dynamic and not a static one. Each of us,
during normal growth and development, exhibits a long succession of different
outward forms. The appearance of an 80-year-old adult differs greatly from
that of a newborn child, and yet we speak without hesitation of both as persons.
In both cases, we have learned to recognize the physical appearances associated
with those developmental stages as normal expressions of human personhood.
As more and more people become knowledgeable about prenatal
development, including the appearance of the unborn in their normal growth,
it will seem natural to recognize them for what they are:
Page 59
human beings in an early stage of development. To insist that the unborn
at six weeks look like the newborn infant is no more reasonable than to expect
the newborn infant to look like a teenager. If we acknowledge as "human"
a succession of outward forms after birth, there is no reason not to extend
that courtesy to the unborn, since human life is a continuum from conception
to natural death. "Human" form consists of whatever is appropriate to a
particular developmental stage — whether at three weeks after conception,
or at age 83, three weeks prior to death. What we call racism discriminates
against certain classes of people whose skin color differs from the preferred
norm for social acceptability and full personhood. What we might call
"antifetalism" discriminates against the unborn on the basis of their physical
appearance as well. Neither form of discrimination deserves any place in
a humane and just society.
Another objection is that in normal usage, the term "person"
is not used of the unborn, at least not in the very earliest stages of
prenatal development. In the abortion decisions of 1973 the U.S. Supreme
Court asserted that the unborn were not persons in the "whole sense" until
birth. It is certainly true that "normal usage" in contemporary America does
not apply the language of personhood to the unborn in the very earliest stages
of their development. This, however, does not settle the issue. Is "normal
usage" in a particular society and historical period the final court of appeal?
At the time of U.S. Constitution was adopted, black slaves were not considered
persons in the "whole sense." For the sake of congressional representation,
the slave-holding states were allowed to count each slave as three-fifths
of a person. Such was "normal usage" at the end of the eighteenth century.
It took a civil war and the Fourteenth Amendment to secure the full rights
of human personhood to black slaves in America. American Indians, of course,
can give eloquent personal testimony of the cruel realities of discriminatory
definitions of personhood. If political rights are a criterion of personhood,
then American women were not considered persons in the "whole sense" well
into the twentieth century. The history of Nazi Germany demonstrates with
terrible clarity the fatal consequences that can follow from a discriminatory
definition of human personhood. And during the late Middle Ages, so many
children died that people
Page 60
did not normally identify infants as persons in the "whole sense."
[34]
All these examples indicate that a culture's perceptions of
personhood can change. The change, of course, is not always for the good,
as the Nazi experience indicates. In America our society's perceptions of
human personhood have undergone a centuries-long process of "reeducation"
or "consciousness raising." Classes of human beings not recognized as persons
in the "whole sense" have asserted their rightful claims to human dignity,
and the society, after long and often violent struggles, has altered its
perceptions. These changes are consistent with the fundamental truths of
the Declaration of Independence, which asserts as a self-evident truth that
"all men are created equal" and are thus endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable rights, chief among which is the very right to life
itself. American history has exhibited the difficult struggle to extend these
fundamental God-given rights to all classes of human beings, irrespective
of class, race, religion, sex, or ethnic origin. The progress of medical
science has given us an ever-expanding knowledge of the unborn as genuinely
individual human beings, and this new scientific information needs to be
recognized by law and by society's conscience.
Another common objection is that many fertilized ova die
prior to birth, as many as 30 to 50 percent. If in the eyes of God, the
objection runs, these fertilized eggs are personal beings, why does God allow
so many of them to perish? First of all, even if these figures were accurate,
they would only be an illustration of the fact that human beings can perish
at any stage of the developmental process, and that prenatal life also has
its hazards. The loss of many human lives in automobile accidents is no argument
against taking responsible steps to reduce highway fatalities. The same
preventive concern should be shown for prenatal human life. As Christians
our valuation of human life is not based on statistical norms but rather
on the norm of divine revelation, which teaches the sacredness and dignity
of each human life.
There are good reasons to question the reliability of the statistics
themselves.[35] Those figures were extrapolated from a
study of only 34 human ova removed within the first 17 days of development
from women who had had hysterectomies. And only a small subsection
Page 61
of this study was used to support the claim that 50 percent of early embryos were lost: 4 of 8 of the ova recovered prior to implantation were abnormal. Since all 34 ova came from women who were hospitalized for various uterine and tubal pathologies, the sample was hardly "normal," and the accuracy of the results is very doubtful.[36] Based on a very narrow and questionable data base, the claims for "fetal wastage" ought not to be granted significant weight in assessing the morality of abortion.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
Our society's official position on abortion obviously conflicts
with the principles of Scripture. Human life is sacred, being created in
the image and likeness of God. God's concern, love, and protection for the
unborn is a reality at every stage of biological development. There is no
biblical evidence that, at any stage of prenatal development, God places
a lesser value on the life of the unborn child. The Scriptures do not limit
the image of God to manifestations of such psychological attributes as
consciousness and memory. Given the fundamental principle of the sanctity
of human life created in the image of God, and the indisputable scientific
fact of the biological continuity between prenatal and postnatal life, there
is a clear scriptural warrant for affirming the sacredness of all human life
at every stage of biological development. While Scripture does not appear
to provide strict proof for the personhood of the unborn from the time of
conception, neither does it rule that out. In fact, the biblical teaching
weighs heavily in that direction. If there is a clear possibility that personhood
is present from conception, then the more ethically responsible approach
is to act on that assumption and treat developing human life as personal
at every stage of prenatal development.
As Professor Paul Ramsey has pointed out, it is extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to find moral arguments that justify excluding the unborn
from personhood and yet do not apply with equal force to the child newly
born.[37] Definitions of personhood based on mental functions
or viability, which justify abortion, appear just as well to support infanticide
for the defective newborn. As Grisez and Boyle have argued, such definitions
of personhood are discriminatory
Page 62
and violate the basic principle of equal protection of the law for all human beings. "Since the only thing common to all already recognized by law as natural persons is membership in the human species, and since the unborn of human genesis are members of the species, no nondiscriminatory basis exists for excluding the unborn from legal personhood."[38] These moral and legal considerations give further weight to the biblical indications for treating the unborn as persons — and not as merely "potential" persons — at every stage of biological development.
Chapter 3 || Chapter 5 || Table of Contents
1. Gerhard von Rad, commenting on Gen. 9:6, observes:
"Attack on man's body is a violation of God's honor."
2. James 3:8-10
3. Cf. G.C. Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God, trans.
Dirk Jellema (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), pp. 67-118, and Emil Brunner,
The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, trans. Olive Wyon
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1952), pp. 75-78 for reviews of the various
interpretations.
4. Cf. Berkouwer, Man, pp. 59, 93: "In all his relations
and acts, he is never man-in-himself, but always man in relation, in relation
to this history of God's deeds in creation, to this origin of an inalienable
relation to his Creator. . . .if we seek to define man merely in terms of
various qualities and abilities, we are not giving a biblical picture of
man."
5. Cf. Joseph Fletcher, "Ethical Aspects of Genetic Controls,"
New England Journal of Medicine 285 (1971): 781.
6. Cf. Q.99 of the Westminster Larger Catechism: ". . .where
a duty is commanded, the contrary sin is forbidden; and where a sin is forbidden,
the contrary duty is commanded. . . ."
7. Cf. Q.135, Westminster Larger Catechism: "The duties required
in the sixth commandment are: all careful studies, and lawful endeavors,
to preserve the life of ourselves and others, by resisting all thoughts and
purposes, subduing all passions, and avoiding all occasions, temptations,
and practices, which tend to be unjust taking away the life of any. . . ."
8. Note the suggestion of Nobel Laureate James Watson on
the matter of newborn children with severe birth defects: "If a child were
not declared alive until three days after birth, then all parents could be
allowed the choice. . . .the doctor could allow the child to die if the parents
so choose and save a lot of misery and suffering." Cited by Dr. and Mrs.
J.C. Willke, Handbook on Abortion (Cincinnati: Hayes, 1975:, p.113.
9. Edward R. Dalglish, Psalm Fifty-One in the Light of
Ancient Near Eastern Patternism (Leiden:E.J. Brill, 1962), p. 121.
10. Waltke, "Reflections from the Old Testament on Abortion,"
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 19, no. 1 (1976): 13;
Dalglish, Psalm Fifty-One, pp.123, 124.
11. Dalglish, Psalm Fifty-One, p. 57.
12. Ibid., p. 124. Dalglish points out that the notion of
the moral law as a natural endowment is found elsewhere in Rom.2:15, where
Paul says of the Gentiles that "What the law requires is written on their
hearts." Though the Gentiles do not have the law, on occasion they "do by
nature what the law requires" (Rom.2:14). There the idea is clearly that
man's moral sense is not merely the product of postnatal socialization, but
is in some sense innate. Dalglish also points to an interesting Talmudic
text, Nidda 30b, which is closely related to the proposed rendering of Ps.
51:6: "[The embryo] is also taught all the Torah from the beginning to end.
. . . As soon as it sees the light, an angel approaches, slaps it on its
mouth and causes it to forget all the Torah completely . . ." (p.125).
13. For similar retrospective references to prenatal
development, cf. Job 10:8-12; 2 Macc.7:22,23. Eccles. 11:5 indicates the
sense of wonder felt by the Hebrews in connection with God's creative activity
in the womb.
14. Albert W. Liley, "The foetus in Control of His Environment,"
in Hilgers and Horan, eds., Abortion and Social Justice ( New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1972), p. 29.
15. F. Delitzsch, Biblical Commentary on the Book of
Job, trans. F. Bolton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, n.d.), 1:166.
16. A.B. Davidson, cited by H.H. Rowley, ed., Job: The
New Century Bible (London: Nelson, 1970), p.102.
17. Norman Habel, The Book of Job (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1975), p.59.
18. E.M. Good, "Love in the Old Testament," Interpreter's
Dictionary of the Bible (New York: Abingdon, 1962), 3:167.
19. Meredith G. Kline, "Lex Talionis and the Human
Fetus," Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 20, no.3 (1977):
193-202.
20. Position 1, the "miscarriage" interpretation, is followed
by the Latin Vulgate, Martin Luther's German Bible, the RSV, the NEB, and
by modern interpreters such as J.C. Rylaarsdaam and Bruce Waltke (Rylaarsdaam,
The Interpreter's Bible, ed. George Buttrick [New York: Abingdon,
1952], 1:999-1000; Waltke, "Old Testament on Abortion," p.3, n.3). Waltke,
however, pointing to the accidental nature of the alleged miscarriage, does
not draw the conclusion that the unborn child is less than a human being
on the basis of the nonimposition of the capital penalty. As previously noted,
he argues in fact that the imago Dei is present from conception.
21. Cf. Calvin, Commentaries on the Last Four Books of
Moses, trans. C. Bingham (reprinted Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, n.d.), 3:41-42;
Keil and Delitzsch, Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament: Volume 2,
The Pentateuch, trans. J. Martin (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, n.d.), pp.
134, 135): U. Cassuto, Commentary on Exodus, trans. I. Abrahams(Jerusalem:
Magnes, 1967), pp. 273-77; Harold Brown, "What the Supreme Court Didn't Know,"
Human Life Review 1, no.2 (1975):8-11; Donald Shoemaker, Abortion,
the Bible, and the Christian (Cincinnati: Hayes, 1976), pp. 37-39; Jack
Cottrell, "Abortion and the Mosaic Law," Christianity Today, March
16, 1973, pp. 6-9; C.C. Ryrie, "The Question of Abortion," in You Mean
the Bible Teaches That. . . (Chicago: Moody, 1974), pp. 86-88; John Frame
et al., "Report of the Committee to Study the Matter of Abortion," Agenda:
38th General Assembly, Orthodox Presbyterian Church (1971), pp. 94-98.
Bernard Jackson, "The Problem of Exod. 21:22-5," Vetus Testamentum
23 (1973: 273-304, holds that v. 22 originally referred to a premature live
birth, but that through a long process of redaction the meaning of the entire
passage has been substantially changed.
22. Gen. 25:25-26; 35:11; 38:28-30; Exod. 1:5; Deut. 28:57;
2 Sam. 16:11; 1 Chron. 1:12; Job 1:21; 3:11; Eccles. 5:15; Jer. 20:18. Num.
12:12 indicates the birth of a stillborn child.
23. Kline, "Lex Talionis."
24. In the following discussion I am indebted to G.C. Berkouwer,
Man; H. Wheeler Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man, 3rd
ed. (Edinburgh: T.& T. Clark, 1926); John A.T. Robinson, The Body:
A Study in Pauline Anthropology (London: SCM, 1952); Edmond Jacob, "psuche,"
Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (1974), 9:608-31; N. W.
Porteous, "Soul," Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible IV (1962),
4:428-29; George H. Williams, "Religious Residues and Presuppositions in
the American Debate on Abortion," Theological Studies 31, no. 1 (1970):
10-75. Berkouwer and Williams have helpful discussions on the questions of
ensoulment and the creationist-traducianist debate.
25. For a survey of the various positions, and a helpful
philosophical analysis of the concept of personhood, see Gabriel Pastrana,
"Personhood and the Beginning of Human Life." Thomist 41, no. 2
(1977):247-94.
26. J. A. T. Robinson, The Body, p. 14. Robinson
cites in this connection the famous statement of H. Wheeler Robinson: "The
Hebrew idea of the personality is an animated body, and not an incarnated
soul."
27. Jacob, "Psuche,", p. 631.
28. Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, trans.
D. Stalker (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 1:145. Cf. Berkouwer,
Man, p. 75: "It is very noteworthy . . . that there has been an increasing
reluctance to exclude man's body from the image of God — and exclusion
generally supported previously, when theologians sought the content of the
image in man's 'higher' qualities, in contrast to the 'lower' bodily qualities
which should not be considered in connection with the image."
29. Berkouwer, Man, p.205.
30. Herman Ridderbox, Paul: An Outline of His Theology,
trans. J. de Witt (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), p. 116.
31. In this section I am indebted to the article by Graham
A.D. Scott, "Abortion and the Incarnation," Journal of the Evangelical
Theological Society 17 (1974):29-44.
32. Calvin comments on these words as follows: "She calls
Mary the mother of her Lord. This denotes a unity of person in the
two natures of Christ; as if she had said, that he who has begotten a mortal
man in the womb of Mary is, at the same time, the eternal God" (Calvin,
Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists [Grand Rapids: Associated
Publishers, n.d.], p.23).
33. In the rare case of identical twins complete individuality
may not be present from the time of conception. In such cases the zygote
on the seventh or eighth day undergoes "segmentation: and divides into two
identical parts. The definition of person proposed above, however, is framed
in light of the general case, rather than the exception. For a detailed analysis
of the philosophical use of the term "person," see Gabriel Pastrana, "Personhood
and the Beginning of Human Life," Thomist 41, no. 2 (1977):247-94.
34. Philippe Aries, Centuries of Childhood, trans.
R. Baldick (New York: Vintage, 1965), pp. 38-39, cited by James M. Humber,
"The Case Against Abortion," Thomist 39, no. 1 (1975):75.
35. Thomas W. Hilgers, M.D., "Human Reproduction,"
Theological Studies 38, no. 1 (1977): 136-52.
36. Ibid., p. 148.
37. Paul Ramsey, "Points in Deciding About Abortion," in
John T. Noonan, ed., The Morality of Abortion (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1970), p. 84.
38. Germain Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., "Life, Death
and Liberty," Human Life Review 4, no. 4 (1978):67.